Showing posts sorted by relevance for query crypto ag. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query crypto ag. Sort by date Show all posts

Thursday, June 17, 2021

The Iconic Crypto AG Disappears

The recent removal of the iconic Crypto AG logo from its building is the final milestone in the history of the once renowned firm that sold state-of-the-art crypto equipment all over the world. The iconic 1960s building, located in Steinhausen, Switzerland, is to be demolished to make room for apartments. This tale however has a stinging aftermath.
 
This milestone also ends the rather naive era of relying on foreign commercial firms for critical secure communications, certainly in today's digital world. The fate of Crypto AG was sealed in early 2020 when documents revealed the firm was secretly owned by the CIA and West-German federal intelligence service BND since 1970, making it the largest ever compromise of secure communications. Apart from the consequences for the many customers and the firm's reputation, this was also a tragedy for those who worked at Crypto AG.

Take a look at the splendid photos from the bandonned Crypto AG building, taken by photographer Patrick Hürlimann. Seeing these pictures of the empty building, offices and storage rooms, you cannot but feel sad for the many employees, once buzzing around in the hallways and factory, who genuinely gave their best and took pride in developing quality equipment for the best crypto firm in the world.
 
Crypto AG also took good care of its well paid employees, including many benefits. The sailboat in one of the pictures is an eery reminder of the good times, when employees were allowed to sail the firm's boat on Zugersee, the nearby lake. Eventually, some of the firm's engineers and mathematicians became suspicious about interventions by external advisors or illogical modifications to their equipment, but they were either stonewalled by the staff or suddenly lost their job.

To leave behind a lifetime of working can by tough, certainly when they always worked with pride, but imagine seeing decades of hard work turn into an illusion of lies and spying. Not the career ending they dreamed of. But they were not the only disillusioned ones.

Unaware that Crypto AG was owned by the BND and CIA, Swedish entrepreneur Andreas Linde took over the firm and its name in 2018 and established Crypto International AG. In the wake of the revelations, with the export license suspended, Linde had no other options than to dismiss virtually all employees in mid-2020.

Earlier this year, a special prosecutor was appointed to investigate the spy scandal. In May, the Swiss intelligence chief announced he will step down end of August, following criticism about his handling of the Crypto AG case after the scandal broke out.

More about Crypto AG on this Blog and Website

Thursday, February 13, 2020

CRYTPTO AG Fallout

The bombshell news about the rigged Crypto AG equipment is spreading. The renowned Switzerland based crypto firm, a world leader on commercial crypto equipment throughout the Cold War, already came under suspicion in the 1992 Hans Bühler case.

Iran, one of the many countries using Crypto AG equipment, became suspicious after some of their secret communications had leaked. Bühler, a salesman for Crypto AG, was arrested in Iran and imprisoned for nine months. This was a mere the tip of the iceberg.

Six years ago, declassified NSA documents showed a close cooperation between Boris Hagelin, founder of Hagelin Cryptos (later renamed Crypto AG) and his close friend William Friedman. Friedman, a brilliant U.S. cryptologist, already had a career from SIS over AFSA to chief cryptologist for NSA (National Security Agency).

CX-52, the machine that
NSA feared to be unbreakable.
Their 1950's gentlemen's agreement ensured that Boris Hagelin would sell  to "questionable states" only crypto machines of which the message could be decrypted (read) by NSA. The Gentlemen's Agreement seemed to extend into the 1990's, as the Hans Bühler case showed. This cooperation between Crypto AG and NSA was pretty big news in the cryptologic world. NSArchive has more on Hagelin and Friedman.

The current revelations, although more of the same, surpass the old suspicions by far. Journalists from German television ZDF and American news­paper The Washington Post now uncovered the last pieces of the puzzle. The CIA and the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst, West-German Federal Intelligence Service) joint-purchased Crypto AG and took full control already in 1970.

This enabled the CIA, in cooperation with NSA, to develop unnoticeable weakened crypto equipment, sell these worldwide and eavesdrop on the compromised communications of many countries for decades. Eventually, this intelligence coup, called operation RUBICON, reached such proportions that BND decided to pull out in 1993, making CIA the sole owner of Crypto AG.

Crypto AG was liquidated and sold in 2018, two years before the CIA and BND ownership and operation RUBICON came to light. Two companies independently acquired part of the Crypto AG assets. One company took over the Swiss part and has the Swiss government as only customer. The other company took over the international branch of Crypto AG and also acquired the brand name. The owner  stated that they are a completely different company, until recently unaware of the links between Grypto AG, CIA and BND. They will change their company name.

Crypto Museum, who took part in the investigations in cooperation with the Dutch investigative VPRO radio Argos, has an excellent overview of the case and press coverage and many links to detailed information about Boris Hagelin, Crypto AG and the secret alliance with BND, NSA and CIA.

Greg Miller of The Washington Post gave an excellent 37 minutes summary of the Crypto AG spying on NPR podcast. More about the Hagelin CX-52, one of the compromised machines, at Cipher Machines and Cryptology and at the Swiss National Museum blog.

Update! The Full Operation RUBICON Story just release by Crypto Museum. They compiled an incredibly detailed full story on operation Rubicon with all agreements, timelines, involved persons, agencies and equipment. If you visited that page before, make sure to refresh the page to load all new information.

End of story? Not quite. Apart from the damage to the neutral image of Switzerland, there are many questions that are left open. The documents revealed that Crypto AG not only sold weakened machines to "questionable states" but also to several NATO allies. Among them was Belgium, a diplomatic hotspot with NATO and EU in Brussels.

Weakened encryption could help the enemy to read those messages, and that's exactly what the Soviets did. They also shared that knowledge, as documented in BStU files (German federal Stasi archives). The Soviets had excellent cryptologists, but even Cuba provided the East-German Stasi with info on cryptanalysis and decryption of Crypto AG equipment from various South American and Western European countries. Not quite a testimony of quality for Crypto AG, but that was their intention. More on compromised Crypto AG merchandise at SAS Chiffrierdienst (translated).

Insecure NATO members' equipment might well have leaked sensitive information to the Russians. The BND left operation RUBICON just a few years after the Berlin wall came down. Was it because they discovered in seized Stasi files that the Russians & friends could read Crypto AG messages from friends and foes? And CIA wasn't worried? Just collateral damage? The murky world of crypto  where even former Stasi cryptologists work for NATO. So many connected dots.

On my website you will find more on Hagelin-Cryptos and Crypto AG.

The whole mess reminds us of Organisation Gehlen, the post-war West-German intelligence and predecessor of the BND. Organisation Gehlen was kindly assisted by the US Army, who de facto ran it as a department. The CIA took over from 1949 until 1956, when Gehlen dissolved in the new BND, not coincidentally the era of the gentlemen's agreement.

The cooperation between the BND and U.S. intelligence was naturally and had many advantages, so close to the Iron Curtain. Already before the end of World War II, U.S. military TICOM teams rounded up scientists that could be useful. One of them was Oskar Vierling, prolific physicist and engineer with his Feuerstein Laboratory. His research proved interesting for various German and American post-war organisations.

Vierling's crypto research and work for ZfCh, the German central cryptologic service, eventually ended when he (willingly or not) sold the rights to his crypto equipment  to... you guessed, Crypto AG's predecessor Hagelin Cryptos, who's founder Boris Hagelin already had an alliance with William Friedman. This might have been the wisest decision ever that saved Vierling's firm from becoming a CIA subsidiary. More about the Feurstein Laboratory on this post.

The close cooperation between German and American intelligence also had its drawbacks. A most damaging case was Heinz Felfe, a Nazi SS officer with the SD Sicherheitsdienst (Foreign Intelligence branch of the SS). He was recruited by British Intelligence who quickly dropped him on suspicion of working for the Soviets.

Eventually, Felfe was recruited by, of all places, the Counter-Intelligence section of the Gehlen Organization (read CIA subsidiary). Felfe, in reality a Soviet spy, caused enormous damage to Western Intelligence. More about Felfe's devastating escapades in this post.

More posts about Crypto AG
 

Tuesday, February 18, 2020

CRYPTO AG Alternatives?

The latest news about insecure Crypto AG equipment, sold not only to foes, but also to some friends, was not that surprising, given the warning signs that popped up in the past. The scale and duration of the operation is a surprise, but it's all part of the game called intelligence collection.

Despite those early red flags, Crypto AG, and its owners CIA and BND, managed to convince customers to maintain confidence in their crypto products. The reputation of the firm and its location in "neutral" Switzerland helped. The question is whether those customers had any choice, or alternatives?

In reality, truly secure communications is all but easy. Communications security is a highly specialised discipline, comprising a whole range of rules, regulations, technical requirements and equipment. Special dedicated equipment can provide such security, but trusting the manufacturer is essential. However, in the field of cryptography, so intertwined with security and intelligence collection, trusting others is not that smart. What are the alternatives? For a start, they are always costly, either in money or in effort.

Since people tend to prefer easy, they often choose cheap and simple. Today, that’s an application from their app store, or an add-on for their e-mail or browser software. Some diligent distrustful might download actual encryption software and have decent anti-virus software. In general, this creates more problems than solve them, and here’s why.

Normal computers, laptops, tablets and smartphones are absolutely not suitable to run encryption software, despite some vendors claiming otherwise. All these devices have numerous processes running in the background. Plug-ins, add-ons and other unidentified software, often downloaded automatically, for the sake of compatibility, convenience, or at the request of the user.

Software developers who claim their software provides secrecy and privacy on your personal computer or smartphone actually do not know what they are talking about. Not because of incompetence, but simply because they really have no idea of all the processes running before or after installing their software. Often, the user is both cause and problem, with kind assistance of your OSI layers, or Open Systems Interconnection (what's in a name). Seven layers of security nightmare.

Therefore, running crypto software might prevent your wife or neighbour from reading your e-mails, but won’t prevent state actors or professional hackers from doing so. Theoretically it takes far too long to crack strong encryption, but in 95% of the cases they don’t waste time and retrieve your data before encryption.

The most secure solution is off-line encryption on a dedicated computer or device. which is never connected to the security nightmare called Internet. This will make it harder, but not always impossible. Should you use commercial software, proprietary secret encryption algorithms, or develop your own crypto algorithm, and would that be secure?

Various publicly available algorithms are peer-reviewed and pretty secure. They take far too much time to crack, in theory. There are however always actors with more brain power and resources who might discover and exploit a mathematical shortcut. It's important that the user fully understands how the encryption works and can verify its performance, which is very hard. So he just has to trust the manufacturer? What's left?

There’s one type of encryption, truly unbreakable today, and in the future, no matter what technology might arise. Unbreakable because it's an equation with two unknowns, mathematically impossible to solve. It’s called one-time pad (OTP). Hailed in the past for protecting communications for diplomacy, military and intelligence, and still used for special purposes, this encryption method, performed on machines or with pencil and paper, provides secure communications, under the condition that it is implemented properly.

The famous Cold War Washington-Moscow hotline, encrypted with ETCRRM one-time tape machines, is a well known example. The paper version, shown below, was the favourite spy encryption for decades, often used in numbers stations. One-time pad has never been broken, and some erroneous claims are in fact cases of implementation errors.

One-time letter pad booklet with reciprocal encryption table.
Image © Dirk Rijmenants
One-time pad has two main drawbacks, which are however not technically insurmountable: true randomness and key distribution. OTP encryption requires truly random keys, as long as the message, and used only once. This creates logistical issues.

In the heydays of one-time pad, this meant a special courier from the organisation – usually state actors – that securely transports the keys. Secure key logistics is the sole reason why this unbreakable encryption is not generally used today, because secure logistics means costs.

Are costs really a problem? Today’s technology enables easy production and secure physical transport of vast amounts of key material (read bytes) on a small carrier, to provide year-long encryption before fully consumed, making it pretty cheap per byte. It's a question of willing to provide the technical infrastructure and funding. Even quantum key distribution already exists and is operational.

Secure transport might cost more than free exchange of  asymmetric cryptography's public-keys, but costs are relative. Ask Crypto AG customers, both adversaries and friendly states. Their costs for the equipment they bought, the training they received, maintenance and, last but least, the costs and damage caused by their compromised communications... for decades. Extremely expensive in terms of security and possibly also economic losses through industrial espionage.

Crypto AG HC-7845 world's first 1 Gigabit VPN encryption in 2009... can we trust it?
Earlier Cold War Hagelin/Crypto AG machines at the History of Hagelin page.
If they had used one-time pad encryption, common practice until the early 1980s, instead of Crypto AG equipment, it would have been less practical, a bit more costly, but in the end far cheaper than trusting their most critical secrets to outsiders and man-made algorithms with all their flaws, weaknesses and, as history showed, hidden intentional weaknesses. One-time pad, on the other hand, is simple, fast, transparent, easy to verify its proper functioning when applied in machines and yes, less practical.

However, if we talk about vital secure communications, what’s most important? Cheap, easy and insecure, or costly, hard and secure. One lesson throughout history is that real security is never cheap, always requires effort, but pays off. Unfortunately, little Joe, big companies and government agencies all want it to be easy and cheap, and they are at the same time addicted to producing and sending ever larger amounts of sensitive information. Weak security? We actually asked for it, and we got it.

Visit the one-time pad page on Cipher Machines and Cryptology to learn more about the history and use of unbreakable encryption. You want to use encryption that is – clearly – more secure than rigged Crypto AG machines? You can, but only if you strictly follow all the one-time pad rules! Read about it in the Guide to Secure Communications with One-time Pad (pdf). It’s unbreakable, free, transparent and fun, if you have some time to spare. There's also the history of Crypto AG and predecessor Hagelin Cryptos.

If you want to know why public-key cryptography solved the key exchange problem but not the actual security of our communications, check out Is One-time Pad History? (pdf). This was written many years ago, and a note was added in 2015 about how reality had surpassed our greatest fears by far. Well, we doubled down on that one again.

Thursday, March 19, 2020

Crypto AG & Operation RUBICON at Crypto Museum

The Crypto Museum just released the full story about Operation RUBICON, the CIA and BND joint-purchase of Crypto AG, once world leader of secure encryption equipment. The Crypto Museum took part in the investigations with Dutch investigative VPRO radio Argos, and cooperated with various media like the Washington Post and the German ZDF.

They compiled a tremendously detailed page with a wealth of information about the people and organisations involved, the secret agreements with AFSA, NSA, and later CIA and BND, the intelligence operations, legal constructions to disguise the true owners of Crypto AG, the targetted countries and various timelines.

Crypto Museum also provides extensive information about the rigged equipment with links to additional information at their vast website collection. All this based on years of research and many disclosed documents. The RUBICON page is a true treasure trove and historical reference.

Visit the Crypto Museum RUBICON page to learn everything about the Crypto AG spy scandal. If you already visited their RUBICON page before, make sure you refresh the page in your browser, as the page has been expanded quite a bit!

Before you dive into the fascinating Crypto Museum information, Swiss Radio and TV SRF has an excellent intro on the Crypto AG case (subtitles available).


Cryptoleaks – Wie CIA und BND weltweit spionierten

Friday, July 24, 2009

Crypto AG Magazines

The Crypto AG magazine is published every four months. The magazine focuses on various aspects of cryptography such as ICT security, software and hardware cryptographic technology, cyber threats, security management and many more.

In the 1/2009 issue you can find the chapter "Milestones in the history of the company part 1: the 1950s". In this article, you'll find the Crypto AG family tree on mechanical cipher machines and a description and images of several Hagelin machines such as the C-36, C-52 and the CD-57. Some Telex encryption equipment and one-time pad are also mentioned. I'm most curious to the next parts of this series.

The magazines are available in English, German, Spanish, Russian and Arabic. They are downloadable from the Cyrpto AG website. If this magazine is new to you, it's worth while reading some of the previous publications.

Update 2020: The magazines are no longer available at Crypto AG, as the firm now has a new owner, but they are preserved by the Crypto Museum. More about Crypto AG in these posts.

Sunday, November 05, 2006

Hagelin Crypto Machines

Boris Hagelin
The story of cipher machines is for an important part written by one man. His name was Boris Hagelin. This brilliant Swedish engineer took over management of A. B. Cryptograph in 1925 and developed a series of Hagelin Cryptos machines that would lead the market of encryption devices for decades.

After the Second World War Hagelin moved to Zug in neutral Switzerland and established Crypto AG. Many of his machines were commercially successful, thus making him the only inventor and developer of crypto machines in history to have made a fortune in that market.

After his first machine in 1925, the electromechanical B21, Hagelin developed the infamous drum-and lug encryption system, introduced in the first C type machine C-35. This machine was soon followed by the C-36, C-38 and the American licenced version M-209, of which more than 140,000 were produced.

Many different versions of the C type machines were sold all over the world. In the Cold War era the C-52 and CX-52 set a new standard in cryptographic security. The electrical keyboard version BC-52 was a huge commercial success and was sold to more than 60 countries. He also developed the CD-55 and CD-57 pocket cipher machines, the TMX, T-52 and T-55 teleprinter encryption systems. The only rotor cipher machine, ever produced by Hagelin was the HX-63 which had an incredible 10600 key space.

After the transition to fully electronic machines Crypto AG kept playing a leading role in the development of new crypto systems such as the H-4605, HC-520, and more recently the SECOS radio series, MULTICOM radio encryption, encrypted satellite lines and many IT solutions.

Visit History of Hagelin-Cryptos and Crypto AG for more on Boris Hagelin and his crypto machine. You can also download freeware software simulations of the BC-52 and M-209 cipher machines.

Update: In February 2020, documents revealed that Crypto AG was joint-purchaised by the CIA and BND intelligence agencies, making it one of the largest and longest intelligence operations ever. More about this in the blog post Crypto AG Fallout.

Saturday, March 07, 2020

Podcast Nuggets Episode 5

Click for more
After a long break, we're at it again. Three podcast nuggets to spoil the ears and mind. Recent news as a starter. The renowned company Crypto AG that turned out to be a CIA & BND subsidiary. Next stop, a talk about how you make it possible for U.S. spooks to operate in Moscow, and finally the former CIA chief of station Moscow about handling their top Russian spy. Almost three hours of fascinating spy mania. Get your headphones, listen very carefully... and watch your back!

NPR - Uncovering The CIA's Operation To Steal State Secrets. Washington Post reporter Greg Miller was one of the investigative journalists who uncovered the truth about the highly respected Swiss company Crypto AG, once world leader of encryption equipment with customers in more than 120 countries. CIA documents revealed that Crypto AG was joint-purchased by the CIA and BND, the West-German Federal Intelligence, as early as 1970. It was the start of the largest ever worldwide compromise of secure communications for many decades. See also my previous posts Crypto AG Fallout and Crypto AG Alternatives.

SPYCAST - Moscow Rules with Jonna Mendez. The story of CIA operations officer Tony Mendez (the real Argo) and his wife Jonna, both experts in disguise who were ground-breaking experts in developing techniques that enables American spies to operate under the noses of the almighty KGB’s countersurveillance. Cloak is the vital part of cloak and dagger. Tony sadly past away in 2019. The book is also a tribute to his work. I recently bought the book The Moscow Rules, and I can highly recommended.

SPYCAST- Conversation with David Rolph. This Former CIA Chief of Moscow station was one of the case officers that handled Adolf Tolkachev, probably the most valuable CIA assets ever in the Soviet Union. The CIA had to operate and have meetings with Tolkachev, despite overwhelming KGB surveillance. If you liked this podcast and want to know more about Tolkachev, you definitely have to read the book The Billion Dollar Spy from David Hoffman (see my book review).  There's More about Tolkachev on this blog.

Thursday, February 11, 2016

Castle Feuerstein Laboratorium

There are many stories, some more fiction than real, about mysterious Nazi laboratories in dark castle dungeons where SS scientists performed all kinds of occult experiments. The Nazi obsession with the Ahnenerbe or the elite Wewelsburg SS school and center for archaeological excavations are probably the most sinister real examples, portrait in pc games like Return to Castle Wolfenstein.

What if I told you that scientists, led by Dokter Oskar Vierling, worked in a secretive laboratorium called Castle Feuerstein. Sounds like a sequel to the Castle Wolfenstein game? Not quite! Burg Feuerstein, located in Ebermannstadt, close to Nürnberg (Eng. Nuremberg), was all but fiction. A physicist in a mysterious laboratorium, how could that possibly relate to crypto and intelligence? Here's how...

The Hunt for Science

Feuerstein was an important target of TICOM, a secret WW2 Allied project to capture German scientists and seize SIGINT stations,  cryptographic and communications equipment, just before Germany surrendered. The mission of TICOM (Target Intelligence Committee) was to collect as much as possible German science and technology, preferably before Soviet forces got their hands on it. To achieve this, TICOM sent fast-moving teams to pre-determined valuable locations inside the collapsing Germany, sometimes ahead of Allied troops.

Burg Feuerstein in Ebermannstadt

Is there a better way to hide a secret laboratorium than to build a typical Frankischen Schweiz style castle on top of a mountain in plain sight? It was so obtrusive that no one would suspect its purpose. Castle Feuerstein was built from scratch in 1941 by Dr Vierling with private funds. He was a physicist, electronics engineer and professor in high-frequency technology and electroacoustics. Laboratorium Feuerstein started its research in 1942 and developed experimental communications systems. At its peak, Feuerstein housed 200 staff and workers. TICOM only learned about Feuerstein's existence from decoded intercepts that referred to its research.

A Most Prolific Scientist

The scientists, led by Dr Vierling, worked on a variety of projects, including high speed transmitters for covert agents, receivers, wave traps, accurate filter design, speech scramblers, voice frequency spectrography, teleprinter cipher (crypto) attachments, improvements on cipher machines, a synchronisation system for the Lorenz SZ42 cipher teleprinter, acoustics and filter components for acoustic torpedoes, anti-radar coating for submarines, a night fighter control system, various frequency generators and an electronic calculator to solve sine and cosine equations. They were a busy bunch!

Dr. Oskar Vierling
Just before the German collapse, Dr Vierling was ordered to relocate his speech projects to Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian Alps and to destroy all other projects and equipment. Vierling, however, had other plans with his Feuerstein legacy. Once the Nazi's were off to Berchtesgaden with the speech equipment, he stored the most valuable equipment and plans in a large bomb proof walk-in vault, hidden behind a false wall in Feuerstein. There, he awaited the end of the war.

Vierling Safeguards His Future

Castle Feuerstein was used as a German Army hospital at the time the TICOM team arrived. They rounded up the scientists and Dr Vierling proved very willing to cooperate with TICOM. Vierling and his group rushed to restore the laboratory and continued their work on selected projects under control of TICOM investigators.

NSA's declassified AXIS SIGINT in WWII, Vol II, Notes on German High Level Cryptography and Cryptanalysis contains some interesting crypto related info. The Lorenz SZ-42c cipher teleprinter with synchronisation, named SK-44 and SK-45, would generate and send a continuous pseudo-random five-bit stream. The receiver mixed its identical stream, by XOR-ing, with the incoming stream, resulting in nothing to print, since (K ⊕ K) = 0. When sending a message, the plain teleprinter message was mixed into the stream. The receiver mixed, as usual, the received signal with its own stream, which results in cancelling out the stream and the original plain message being printed instantly, since (K ⊕ M) ⊕ K = M.

An eavesdropper would not know if or when the random stream contained an actual message or how long it was, thus effectively preventing traffic analysis. The U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA) suggested that analysis of the continuous mostly non-message-carrying pseudo-random stream, generated by the  SZ-42c, might compromise the machine's secret key settings. This would enable them to predict the stream and decipher all message that follow. The principle of continuous random stream was nevertheless brilliant and used in the 1950s on the more advanced U.S. KWR-37 JASON and KWT-37 Fleet Broadcast crypto system.

Speech scrambling research by Dr Vierling's team produced little result. In 1943, only Dr Vierling and Telefunken still worked on ciphony (encrypted voice) and from 1944 on only Dr Vierling. At war ends, Feuerstein's research on ciphony focused on synthetic speech, encrypted by triple wobbling. The speech was separated in eight frequency bands. These were encrypted in a three stage ring wobbling (shifting the frequencies up and down) where the stage was split in half and these halves wobbled separately. However, speech quality after de-wobbling was very bad and ASA considered the German scientists several years away from developing any usable ciphony.

Declassified Feuerstein Documents

More details about the Feuerstein laboratory and Dr Vierling's work is available in chapter VIII, page 37 (pdf p.39) from (Volume 8 Miscellaneous NSA) of NSA's declassified files on European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II. The rebuild of the lab under control of TICOM is described the Interim Report on Laboratorium Feuerstein from the NARA archive. (first pages are double, start reading from page 5). Another excellent source is the TICOM Archive. These documents contain enough inspiration for a few Wolfenstein sequels.

The importance of Feuerstein for TICOM is shown in ASA documents. The Temporary Duty Report NSA of Mr William Friedman, the renowned U.S. cryptologist, is a resume of his tour in Germany from July to September 1945, in cooperation with TICOM. Vierling's Laboratorium, noted as important TICOM target, was one of the sites he visited in July 1945. NSA has a few more documents related to Dr Vierling.

Post-War Crypto and Intelligence Work

After the war, Prof Dr Oskar Vierling continued working at his 1941 established firm VIERLING GmbH but relocated to Ebermannstadt, a mere kilometer from Castle Feuerstein. He had quite a prolific career, developing crypto machines, covert radio transmitters, eavesdropping devices, radio direction finding and various measuring and test equipment. He worked for Organisation Gehlen (post-war West-German intelligence), its successor the Bundesnachrichtendienst (foreign intelligence), the Zentralstelle für Chiffrierwesen (central cryptologic service) and the Deutsche Bundespost. From the 1930s until the 1950s he was also an important pioneer in the development of electronic and electro-acoustic instruments.

Due to legal restrictions on crypto export, Dr Vierling sold the rights for his crypto equipment to Crypto AG's predecessor Hagelin Cryptos. NSA archives show that Dr Vierling developed crypto machines in cooperation with ASA and NSA, at least until 1953. See Crypto devices of VierlingASA loan Vierling device and purchase transistors for Vierling. These documents show that Vierling provided a crypto machine for analysis and ASA supplied transistors for Vierling's crypto experiments. Transistors were quite novel in 1953 and their use in crypto equipment pretty unique.

Vierling's firm is currently still located in Ebermannstadt. Today, Burg Feuerstein is a catholic youth center.

Wednesday, December 21, 2022

Mission: Impossible - Cyber Security

Cyber security is an ever-evolving battle that we can never win. The reason is simple. Virtually no one actually knows what is running on their computer at this very moment. And yes, that's a bit scary.

Gary Ruddell created a series of videos that are both entertaining and professionally made. His website provides insight in cyber security and includes articles, a newsletter and also workshops for those who are interested in a career in cyber. Here's one of his videos.

 
Secure communications is indeed quite complex. Luckily, there are professional firms that provide secure solutions. At least, that is what we expect them to do. However, the former Swiss firm Crypto AG had a hidden agenda, as I explained in previous posts. Garry also created a perfect introduction video about the shady adventures of that firm.
You can visit Garry's website at www.garyruddell.com to learn more about cyber security. Make sure to visit his Youtube channel to discover more videos. Highly recommended.

Tuesday, January 23, 2007

Hagelin C-52 and CX-52

Hagelin CX-52
© D. Rijmenants
The C-52 and CX-52 from Hagelin Cryptos (Crypto AG, Switzerland) are one of the most successful state-of-the-art cipher machines ever build. Thanks to a simple but brilliant design these all-mechanical devices have a tremendous key space and cryptographic strength. The pin-and-lug type CX-52 cipher machine has a total of 4.13 x 1099 possible keys!

The introduction of this machine caused quiet some disturbance in the cryptanalytic community. The C-52 and CX-52 are without a doubt the most popular Cold Ware era cipher machines. They were sold to more than 60 countries and remained popular for decades.

A complete description, the technical details and working principle of this machine can be found on my Hagelin C-52 & CX-52 page. Dutch readers can go to this page.

Sunday, September 03, 2006

Hagelin BC-52 Simulator

I just finished a new cipher machine simulator, the Hagelin BC-52. It's an accurate simulation of one of the most powerful and commercial successful machines of engineer Boris Hagelin. Hagelin developed this cipher machine for high level military and diplomatic encryption. In 1952 Hagelin Cryptos (Crypto AG) introduced the notorious C-52, raising the security of drum-and-lug devices to another level.

The machine had 6 irregular moving pinwheels, selected from a set of 12, and the number of drum bars was extended to 32, of which 5 where also used to advance the wheels. The combination of C-52 and the keyboard, denoted B-52, was named BC-52. Within short time the BC-52 was purchased by more than 60 countries and remained popular until today.

The simulator is available as freeware download on my website.

Friday, December 18, 2009

Enigma Patents

Enigma Rotor in Patent
The Crypto Museum website has published a large number of original patents, related to the German Enigma cipher machine. These documents, dated from 1918 to 1923, show the development of the Enigma machine and contains a large number of detailed technical drawings. Electrical circuits, different types of ciphering wheels and various mechanisms to advance them, printing systems and much more.

Some of the patents were filed by German engineer Arthur Scherbius, others by firms such as Gewerkschaft Securitas of Berlin and Chiffriermaschinen AG, both related to Scherbius. However, similar patents were filed by firms in the United States, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, some of them related to Germany based companies.

All patents are available in pdf format on Paul Reuvers' and Marc Simons' Crypto Museum Enigma patents page. More patents are found on Arthur Bauer's Foundation for German Communication.